Last week I wrote about the biblical purity system. This week I’d like to discuss the impact of the biblical system on post-Temple Judaism.
After some initial ambiguity, it became accepted that most of the biblical purity regulations applied only when the temple stood, since their practical implications were limited to access to the sanctuary and to entities dedicated to the sanctuary. Exceptions to this rule occur where biblical law suggests implications that extend beyond the sphere of the sanctuary. These exceptions occur in three major areas:
1. Pure and impure animals, birds, insects, etc. In addition to transmitting ritual impurity, impure creatures may not be eaten, according to Leviticus 11. This chapter also specifies the ways in which these creatures may transmit impurity to various types of vessels (vv. 32-36). These regulations form the basis for the laws pertaining to the maintenance of kosher cooking implements and dishes.
2. Purity of priests. Priests (kohanim) are prohibited from contracting death-impurity except in very specific situations (Leviticus 21:1-4). Although one might logically assume that this prohibition derives from the priests’ role in the Temple, the Bible states the prohibition categorically. Observant kohanim therefore refrain from visiting cemeteries to this day.
3. Menstrual impurity Leviticus 18:19 prohibits sexual intercourse with a woman in a state of menstrual impurity. The basis for determining this state and purifying oneself of it is derived from Leviticus 15:19-30. The sacrifices called for by verse 29, of course, can no longer be offered, but women are required to immerse in water from a natural source (referred to as a mikveh), a process that the biblical text describes as “washing oneself in water.”
The rabbinic development of #3 puzzles me in a number of respects, which I will outline below. I would appreciate it if those of you with more extensive knowledge of this area of halachah could help enlighten me.
First, I am somewhat confused about the immersion requirement. The Bible does not mandate that a woman immerse after menstruation, or after any other form of discharge, for that matter. (It does, inexplicably, mandate that women immerse from semen-impurity contracted through sexual intercourse.) My understanding is that the rabbis derive the requirement of immersion after menstruation from the requirement that men immerse after contact with menstrual blood (vv. 20-24). (Ironically, this requirement no longer applies, since the impurity of males has implications only insofar as the sanctuary is concerned.) My questions are as follows: Is immersion after menstruation considered halachah mi-de’oraita (“biblical” law)? If so, is it derived by means of gezerah shavah (analogy) or some other legal mechanism, or is it simply assumed?
Second, I am perplexed by the fact that the rabbis deemed the laws of zavah relevant to the prohibition against sex with a menstruant. A zavah is defined by as a woman who experiences a long or irregular blood flow, as per Leviticus 15:25-30. Unlike women with regular periods, who remain impure for seven days following the onset of menstruation, zavot remain impure for seven days following the cessation of blood flow, presumably to ensure that the flow will not resume without notice.
Based on the biblical text alone, it would seem that the laws of zavah should apply to off-cycle periods, or to periods lasting longer than seven days. The rabbis, however, considered any flow of three days or longer a case of zavah, and the Talmud (BT Niddah 66a) relates that Jewish women took on the additional stringency of applying the laws of zavah to isolated blood stains “the size of a mustard seed” or larger. Because of the difficulty of differentiating between cases of niddah (regular menstruation) and cases of zavah, the rabbis eventually instituted a new law calling for the stricter zavah regulations to be applied to regular menstruation as well (BT Niddah 67b). Thus, contemporary Orthodox wives wait seven days after the cessation of menstruation, even when their periods are regular, before immersing in a mikveh and resuming sexual relations with their husbands.
My question is, why should the rules of zavah apply in post-Temple times at all? Leviticus 18 prohibits sex with a woman in a state of niddah impurity, not a state of zavah impurity. This may seem like hair-splitting, but it is the sort of hair-splitting that constitutes the bulk of rabbinic law. True, it would be illogical to prohibit sex with a woman experiencing a regular period and permit it in the case of a lengthy or irregular period. This could be resolved, however, by applying the laws of niddah to cases of zavah. Applying the laws of zavah to cases of niddah strikes me as beyond the realm of reasonable stringency. What was the purpose of instituting such a law?
Even stranger, contemporary Orthodox practice requires a woman to wait an initial five days before counting the extra seven, even if her period is exceptionally short. The reason for this, as I understand it, is that a woman may expel semen for several days after intercourse, resulting in a state of semen-impurity (also referred to as zavah). As I’ve noted, the Torah does not explicitly prohibit sex with a woman experiencing an irregular period, and it certainly doesn’t prohibit sex with a woman in a state of semen-impurity. Even if such a counter-intuitive prohibition did exist, it should only prevent a woman from immersing while she might still be expelling semen, that is (to use the rabbis’ somewhat overzealous estimate) for five days after intercourse. To prevent her from even beginning to count the requisite seven days preceding immersion seems to me to defy common sense.
Finally, I understand that women who ovulate early, during their period of niddah, and are therefore unable to conceive (a state known as “halachic infertility”) are sometimes given dispensation to begin counting the extra seven days before the initial five are completed. However, they are never (as far as I know) given dispensation to forgo the extra seven, which would seem to be the truly superfluous ones. Thus, these dispensations are unhelpful to a majority of women, whose periods typically last longer than five days. Is this because the seven days are a matter of rabbinic law (halachah mi-derabbanan), while the five are a matter of custom (minhag)? Even if this is the case, there are other situations in which rabbinic law is waived on account of extreme need. (Not only to save a life – for that purpose, even biblical law is waived.) Why not here?
Wednesday, April 13, 2005
Monday, April 11, 2005
CJLS Reaffirms Commitment to Ambiguity
In 1992, the Conservative Committee on Jewish Laws and Standards met to discuss the role of gays and lesbians in Jewish communal life. While affirming that homosexuals were welcome in Conservative "youth groups, camps, and schools," the resolution that emerged from the 1992 meeting was largely negative. Gays and lesbians would remain barred from rabbinic and cantoral positions; same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies would be prohibited; individual rabbis would retain the right to bar gays and lesbians from leadership positions of any sort.
Last week, the CJLS revisited the issue amid much fanfare. A revised resolution was issued, which contained the following decisive statement:
The parameters of sexual conduct for gay and lesbian Jews, their eligibility for admission to rabbinical and cantorial school, and commitment ceremonies remain the subject of a lively debate within the ongoing deliberations of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.
At least this time they acknowledged the debate.
The full text of both statements and some responses can be found here and here.
Last week, the CJLS revisited the issue amid much fanfare. A revised resolution was issued, which contained the following decisive statement:
The parameters of sexual conduct for gay and lesbian Jews, their eligibility for admission to rabbinical and cantorial school, and commitment ceremonies remain the subject of a lively debate within the ongoing deliberations of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.
At least this time they acknowledged the debate.
The full text of both statements and some responses can be found here and here.
Friday, April 08, 2005
Tazria: The Biblical Purity System
[Note to readers: If you've heard any of this before, please let me know. I'm sure I'm not the first to come up with these ideas.]
The biblical purity system is one of the great enigmas of Israelite religion. It makes sense that the Israelites would want to keep that which is distasteful as far as possible away from the sanctum, and that an elaborate system might arise to ensure that this remained the case. But why should menstrual blood and semen be included among the sources of impurity, while urine, vomit, and mucus are not? Why skin diseases and not diseases of the eyes, for example, or the respiratory system? Why is semen impurity removed by bathing and waiting until evening, while birth impurity requires a waiting period of thirty-three to sixty-six days and a sacrifice, and death impurity requires sprinkling with the ashes of a red heifer?
Many attempts have been made to explain the psychology and/or theology behind the system. One popular interpretation, most thoroughly argued by Jacob Milgrom, is that impurity derives from an association with death, and the Israelite deity is a God of life. A human corpse is thus the source of the most severe type of impurity. Genital discharges represent the loss of potential life, because they were all believed to carry generative seed. Skin diseases, which are visibly degenerative, are closely associated with death, and thus generate impurity. Purification offerings (often translated "sin-offerings") involve the sprinkling of blood on various parts of the sanctuary, because blood is a symbol of life and therefore an appropriate "ritual detergent."
I think that this interpretation has merit, but it also has flaws. First, semen emitted in certain contexts may be best described as a "loss of potential life," but the substance itself is the source of impurity, and the substance itself is a source of life. The association of semen with death is most illogical when it is emitted during intercourse. Childbirth, similarly, causes impurity. Though this impurity seems to be associated with the bleeding that occurs during birth, the association with death still strikes me as a little bit strange. (I've heard it argued that bearing children involves a "partial death" for the mother because a human life is exiting her body, but I find this a bit of a stretch.)
Secondly, it is less than logical that blood issuing from human genitals -- a supposed source of generative seed -- symbolizes "death," while blood from a recently slaughtered animal symbolizes "life." This is the sort of reasoning that results from trying to fit the facts to an already established conclusion.
My own recent thought on the matter is that both the creation of life and its loss are potential sources of impurity as well as purity. These are most powerful forces, and they are rightly within the domain of the deity. Occurring in the natural course of human life, these forces generate impurity, but blood deliberately shed in a cultic context has the power to purify. There may be a connection between this idea and the law forbidding the consumption of blood: both an agent of life and a product of death, blood is not for human beings, but rather, for God.
A few additional thoughts: Most of the biblical purification rituals have a certain practical logic to them. Semen impurity cannot reasonably last more than a day or require a material sacrifice, since this would prevent couples from having sex and result in an undue monetary burden on men. Menstrual impurity, similarly, cannot reasonably require a sacrifice each time it occurs, but it must last longer than a day, since menstruation typically continues for about a week. Seven days is an appropriate duration for such impurity, being both the duration of a normal period and a biblical symbol of completion. Lengthy or irregular bleeding requires a seven-day wait after the bleeding has ceased in order to ensure that it does not begin again. Irregular discharges from both men and women require a sacrifice, which is reasonable, since by definition they occur less often than regular discharges; it is also understandable, given their mysterious and frightening nature and the fact that they may pose a health risk. Discharge of blood after childbirth may last for several days, resulting in a state similar to menstrual impurity. A lesser level of impurity follows, because of the lengthy period of infirmity and discharge that typically accompanies "natural" childbirth. Skin diseases require quarantine because they are contagious; this type of impurity cannot be removed before the patient has healed.
Other aspects of the system are less self-evident. One of these appears at the start of this week's Torah portion, where mothers are instructed to observe 7 + 33 days of impurity after giving birth to a boy, and 14 + 66 days for a girl. Those defending the system often point out that impurity may be rendered by the holiest of entities as well as the most profane, so this law is not necessarily misogynistic. I wonder whether females generate greater impurity because of their close association with the process of birth. This may not be either a "positive" or "negative" characteristic per se, but simply a certain type of power, which must be properly regulated.
Another perplexing law appeared in last week's additional reading, parshat parah. Death impurity can be removed only by waiting seven days and having a mixture of water and the ashes of a completely red (or brown) cow sprinkled on oneself with a willow branch. (This occurs both on the third day and the seventh.) Paradoxically, the priest who burns the cow, the man who does the sprinkling, and anyone who touches the ashes of the cow, become impure. It has been argued (reasonably) that the symbolic value of the completely colored cow is to increase the amount of "blood" in the mixture, this being a particularly severe form of impurity requiring a particularly concentrated form of the purifying substance. I would add that the very scarceness of such ashes increases the awe with which human death is regarded. But why should the ashes play a double role, rendering those with death impurity pure and those without it impure? I think that it is not the ashes themselves, but their association with death impurity that gives them the power to render the pure impure. Any association with the realm of human death, even with the substance that allows an individual to exit that realm, must have some consequence. Tellingly, a priest, who is forbidden contact with the dead, does not even sprinkle the purifying waters. For an individual whose purity is of such great consequence, even burning the cow that will later be used to treat death impurity requires a purification process.
The paradoxical red heifer ritual is the best illustration of the dual nature of blood, with its ability to impart or remove impurity, depending on context.
The biblical purity system is one of the great enigmas of Israelite religion. It makes sense that the Israelites would want to keep that which is distasteful as far as possible away from the sanctum, and that an elaborate system might arise to ensure that this remained the case. But why should menstrual blood and semen be included among the sources of impurity, while urine, vomit, and mucus are not? Why skin diseases and not diseases of the eyes, for example, or the respiratory system? Why is semen impurity removed by bathing and waiting until evening, while birth impurity requires a waiting period of thirty-three to sixty-six days and a sacrifice, and death impurity requires sprinkling with the ashes of a red heifer?
Many attempts have been made to explain the psychology and/or theology behind the system. One popular interpretation, most thoroughly argued by Jacob Milgrom, is that impurity derives from an association with death, and the Israelite deity is a God of life. A human corpse is thus the source of the most severe type of impurity. Genital discharges represent the loss of potential life, because they were all believed to carry generative seed. Skin diseases, which are visibly degenerative, are closely associated with death, and thus generate impurity. Purification offerings (often translated "sin-offerings") involve the sprinkling of blood on various parts of the sanctuary, because blood is a symbol of life and therefore an appropriate "ritual detergent."
I think that this interpretation has merit, but it also has flaws. First, semen emitted in certain contexts may be best described as a "loss of potential life," but the substance itself is the source of impurity, and the substance itself is a source of life. The association of semen with death is most illogical when it is emitted during intercourse. Childbirth, similarly, causes impurity. Though this impurity seems to be associated with the bleeding that occurs during birth, the association with death still strikes me as a little bit strange. (I've heard it argued that bearing children involves a "partial death" for the mother because a human life is exiting her body, but I find this a bit of a stretch.)
Secondly, it is less than logical that blood issuing from human genitals -- a supposed source of generative seed -- symbolizes "death," while blood from a recently slaughtered animal symbolizes "life." This is the sort of reasoning that results from trying to fit the facts to an already established conclusion.
My own recent thought on the matter is that both the creation of life and its loss are potential sources of impurity as well as purity. These are most powerful forces, and they are rightly within the domain of the deity. Occurring in the natural course of human life, these forces generate impurity, but blood deliberately shed in a cultic context has the power to purify. There may be a connection between this idea and the law forbidding the consumption of blood: both an agent of life and a product of death, blood is not for human beings, but rather, for God.
A few additional thoughts: Most of the biblical purification rituals have a certain practical logic to them. Semen impurity cannot reasonably last more than a day or require a material sacrifice, since this would prevent couples from having sex and result in an undue monetary burden on men. Menstrual impurity, similarly, cannot reasonably require a sacrifice each time it occurs, but it must last longer than a day, since menstruation typically continues for about a week. Seven days is an appropriate duration for such impurity, being both the duration of a normal period and a biblical symbol of completion. Lengthy or irregular bleeding requires a seven-day wait after the bleeding has ceased in order to ensure that it does not begin again. Irregular discharges from both men and women require a sacrifice, which is reasonable, since by definition they occur less often than regular discharges; it is also understandable, given their mysterious and frightening nature and the fact that they may pose a health risk. Discharge of blood after childbirth may last for several days, resulting in a state similar to menstrual impurity. A lesser level of impurity follows, because of the lengthy period of infirmity and discharge that typically accompanies "natural" childbirth. Skin diseases require quarantine because they are contagious; this type of impurity cannot be removed before the patient has healed.
Other aspects of the system are less self-evident. One of these appears at the start of this week's Torah portion, where mothers are instructed to observe 7 + 33 days of impurity after giving birth to a boy, and 14 + 66 days for a girl. Those defending the system often point out that impurity may be rendered by the holiest of entities as well as the most profane, so this law is not necessarily misogynistic. I wonder whether females generate greater impurity because of their close association with the process of birth. This may not be either a "positive" or "negative" characteristic per se, but simply a certain type of power, which must be properly regulated.
Another perplexing law appeared in last week's additional reading, parshat parah. Death impurity can be removed only by waiting seven days and having a mixture of water and the ashes of a completely red (or brown) cow sprinkled on oneself with a willow branch. (This occurs both on the third day and the seventh.) Paradoxically, the priest who burns the cow, the man who does the sprinkling, and anyone who touches the ashes of the cow, become impure. It has been argued (reasonably) that the symbolic value of the completely colored cow is to increase the amount of "blood" in the mixture, this being a particularly severe form of impurity requiring a particularly concentrated form of the purifying substance. I would add that the very scarceness of such ashes increases the awe with which human death is regarded. But why should the ashes play a double role, rendering those with death impurity pure and those without it impure? I think that it is not the ashes themselves, but their association with death impurity that gives them the power to render the pure impure. Any association with the realm of human death, even with the substance that allows an individual to exit that realm, must have some consequence. Tellingly, a priest, who is forbidden contact with the dead, does not even sprinkle the purifying waters. For an individual whose purity is of such great consequence, even burning the cow that will later be used to treat death impurity requires a purification process.
The paradoxical red heifer ritual is the best illustration of the dual nature of blood, with its ability to impart or remove impurity, depending on context.
Thursday, March 31, 2005
Shemini
[Insert standard Meredith warning here]
I've been thinking about God's Glory -- not as an attribute of God, but as the physical entity that appears to the people of Israel in Leviticus 9. It has been suggested that the phrase kevod Adonai, "the Glory of the Lord," was employed by the (late) priestly authors in an attempt to avoid anthrpomorphism. Their God was supposedly more transcendent than J's or E's, so it would have been inappropriate to speak of God Himself appearing before the Tent of Meeting, consuming sacrifices, and so forth.
A similar claim has been made regarding references in the deuteronomic/ deuteronomistic texts to God's "Name" dwelling in a place of his choosing. The latter claim is, however, being called into question on the basis of Akkadian cognates.* It is argued that in the ancient Near East, a one referred to a king's "name" the way English speakers might refer to his "majesty:" it is a circumlocution, to be sure, but ultimately, the referant is the king himself. (To take another example, it is the Pope, not his "holiness," who is currently receiving nourishment through a feeding tube, regardless of how his doctors may address him.)
It seems to me that the same is probably true of God's "glory," which is, after all, used interchangeably with God's proper name (compare Leviticus 9:4 to verses 6 and 23). In these texts, God Himself is in the "cloud of glory." Perhaps this cloud is a cloud of smoke with a divine fire burning at its center, similar to the pillar that guided the Israelites through the wilderness (although the pillar texts would seem to be J). This would (I think) make better sense of this scene, in which God descends and sends forth fire to consume the offerings with which He is presented, after which the people fall on their faces, having "seen" the Lord.
* See Sandra L. Richter's The Deuteronomistic History and the Name Theology (2002).
I've been thinking about God's Glory -- not as an attribute of God, but as the physical entity that appears to the people of Israel in Leviticus 9. It has been suggested that the phrase kevod Adonai, "the Glory of the Lord," was employed by the (late) priestly authors in an attempt to avoid anthrpomorphism. Their God was supposedly more transcendent than J's or E's, so it would have been inappropriate to speak of God Himself appearing before the Tent of Meeting, consuming sacrifices, and so forth.
A similar claim has been made regarding references in the deuteronomic/ deuteronomistic texts to God's "Name" dwelling in a place of his choosing. The latter claim is, however, being called into question on the basis of Akkadian cognates.* It is argued that in the ancient Near East, a one referred to a king's "name" the way English speakers might refer to his "majesty:" it is a circumlocution, to be sure, but ultimately, the referant is the king himself. (To take another example, it is the Pope, not his "holiness," who is currently receiving nourishment through a feeding tube, regardless of how his doctors may address him.)
It seems to me that the same is probably true of God's "glory," which is, after all, used interchangeably with God's proper name (compare Leviticus 9:4 to verses 6 and 23). In these texts, God Himself is in the "cloud of glory." Perhaps this cloud is a cloud of smoke with a divine fire burning at its center, similar to the pillar that guided the Israelites through the wilderness (although the pillar texts would seem to be J). This would (I think) make better sense of this scene, in which God descends and sends forth fire to consume the offerings with which He is presented, after which the people fall on their faces, having "seen" the Lord.
* See Sandra L. Richter's The Deuteronomistic History and the Name Theology (2002).
Tuesday, March 29, 2005
Galois is Back!
(Actually, it's been back since the beginning of February, but I haven't been keeping up with blogs.)
For those who don't know/ remember, Galois is a blog by Gabriel Rosenberg that deals primarily with the legal and ethical aspects of the same-sex marriage debate in the United States. Gabriel is a mathematician, but he's made some of the best legal arguments I've seen in favor of same-sex marriage. If you are legally minded and interested in this issue, you would probably enjoy Galois, regardless of your personal position.
For those who don't know/ remember, Galois is a blog by Gabriel Rosenberg that deals primarily with the legal and ethical aspects of the same-sex marriage debate in the United States. Gabriel is a mathematician, but he's made some of the best legal arguments I've seen in favor of same-sex marriage. If you are legally minded and interested in this issue, you would probably enjoy Galois, regardless of your personal position.
Thursday, March 24, 2005
A Few Timely Comments
Here is the kiddush that DH used last Purim, in case any of you would like to use it. There may be a revised version by tomorrow.
(Halakhic note: It has been brought to my attention that Ha-gafen covers all beverages just as Ha-motsi covers all foods, so you do not have to -- indeed, should not -- make a separate blessing on the scotch.)
(Note on the note: If this doesn't mean anything to you, feel free to ingore it, or consult your local Rabbi :))
On a very different note, please note (no pun intended; I'm just tired) that today, Ta'anit Esther, is Agunah Awareness Day. An Agunah (pl. agunot) is a woman who has been abandoned by her husband but is unable to remarry because he has denied her a get (religious divorce). You can learn more about the problem and potential solutions here. A prayer for agunot from the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance can be found here.
To those who are fasting, I wish an easy and meaningful fast. To those celebrating Purim tonight and tomorrow, a chag sameach!
UPDATE: This year's kiddush for Purim can be found in DH's Live Journal.
(Halakhic note: It has been brought to my attention that Ha-gafen covers all beverages just as Ha-motsi covers all foods, so you do not have to -- indeed, should not -- make a separate blessing on the scotch.)
(Note on the note: If this doesn't mean anything to you, feel free to ingore it, or consult your local Rabbi :))
On a very different note, please note (no pun intended; I'm just tired) that today, Ta'anit Esther, is Agunah Awareness Day. An Agunah (pl. agunot) is a woman who has been abandoned by her husband but is unable to remarry because he has denied her a get (religious divorce). You can learn more about the problem and potential solutions here. A prayer for agunot from the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance can be found here.
To those who are fasting, I wish an easy and meaningful fast. To those celebrating Purim tonight and tomorrow, a chag sameach!
UPDATE: This year's kiddush for Purim can be found in DH's Live Journal.
Wednesday, March 23, 2005
Vayyiqra/ Tsav
For those who are wondering, I did begin composing a post on Vayyiqra, and I had almost finished when I had to stop and get ready for Shabbat. Fortunately, it was a very general post on the subject of sacrifice and contemporary Judaism, so it is just as applicable to this week's parsha, Tsav, as it would have been to last week's. (I'd like to get into more specific issues eventually, but I'd rather deal with general themes first.) Since Purim is this Friday and I have quite a lot to do, I feel entitled to cheat. So here it is, two parshiyot in one:
The hope for a rebuilt Temple and a revival of the sacrificial order has been a relatively constant feature of Jewish eschatology over the centuries. There have, however, been a few variations. In his Guide for the Perplexed, for example, Maimonedes (1135-1204) posits that animal sacrifice was a primitive form of worship designed for primitive people, and that Jews were ultimately meant to move toward higher forms of worship, such as prayer and, ultimately, completely internal worship of the heart.* Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook (1865-1935) envisioned a restoration of the sacrifical order, but one that would be restricted to vegetarian sacrifices along the lines of the biblical meal offering (mincha**). Unsurprisingly, the Reform and Conservative movements embrace the idea that Jewish worship has "evolved" beyond animal sacrifice.
The traditional musaf prayer (an "additional" prayer for Shabbat and holidays) expresses a desire for the restoration of the sacrifical order. The following paragraph comes from the musaf amidah for Shabbat:
You established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, commanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances with the order of its libations. Those who delight in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai, they [our ancestors] were commanded regarding it, and You, Lord, our God, commanded us to offer the Sabbath additional [musaf] offering in the proper manner. May it be your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, that You bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, so that we may offer the sacrifices required of us there, continual [tamid] offerings in their proper order, and additional offerings in the manner prescribed for them. Then we will prepare and offer the additional offering of this Sabbath day before you with love, according to to Your will, as you wrote for us in your Torah, by the hand of Moses your servant, from Your Glory's mouth. . .
The prayer continues with the text of Numbers 28:9-10, which describes the mussaf offering:
On the Sabbath day, two year-old unblemished lambs, and two tenths of an ephah of fine meal mixed with oil, and its libation. The burnt-offering of the Sabbath, in addition to the continual burnt offering and its libation.
The Conservative Sim Shalom siddur (prayer book) offers several alternative versions of the passage. The least radical casts the offending portions in the past tense:***
You established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, comanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances and the order of its libations. Those who rejoice in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai, they were commanded regarding it, and You, Lord God, commanded them to offer the Sabbath additional offering in the propper manner. May it be Your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, Who returns children to their territory,**** that You bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, where our ancestors offered the offerings required of them, continual offerings in their proper order, and additional offerings in the manner prescribed for them. There we will serve you with love and awe as in ancient times. They prepared and offered the mussaf offering for this Sabbath day before you with love, according to your will, as written in your Torah, by the hand of Moses your servant, from Your Glory's mouth. . .
The quotation from Numbers follows but is designated as optional. After the quote, another line is added:
Compassionate King, accept the prayer of your people Israel with mercy, wherever they dwell.
The Sim Shalom also includes an "alternative" mussaf service, which offers a choice of four substitutes for the above paragraph. The first is based on the traditional version but alters it significantly:
You have established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, commanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances with the order of its libations. Those who rejoice in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai they were commanded regarding it, and you have commanded us to serve you in Jerusalem your city, on your holy Sabbath day, on your holy mountain. May it be Your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, Who returns children to their territory, that you bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, and that violence no longer be heard in our land, or destruction within our borders. There may we serve you in love and awe as in ancient times. Compassionate King, accept the prayer of your people Israel with compassion, wherever they dwell.
The remaining three alternatives were composed in English. They make no mention of past, present, or future worship in Jerusalem, focusing instead on the challanges and rewards of contemporary Sabbath observance.
All this variation within the official liturgy of a single movement attests to the controversiality of eschatology and sacrifice -- two issues to which most "modern" Jews devote very little attention. When we envision a better world, what do we see? A return to a better past? A revival of particular elements of the past, altered to suit contemporary mores? An age of peace between Jews and Muslims (with Jewish control of the Temple Mount, of course)? How do we regard those portions of the Torah that deal with sacrifice? Are they of merely historical interest (not that I have any problem with that)? Are they a forecast of the future? Or is there, perhaps, another option?
* Sorry, no citations this time. You'll just have to take my word for it.
** I am aware of the fact that my transliterations have become less and less consistent over time. You'll have to deal with it.
*** This translation is my own. A less literal translation appears in the siddur itself.
**** A paraphrase of Jeremiah 31:17. The editors of the Sim Shalom never missed an opportunity to sneak in a bit of Zionism.
The hope for a rebuilt Temple and a revival of the sacrificial order has been a relatively constant feature of Jewish eschatology over the centuries. There have, however, been a few variations. In his Guide for the Perplexed, for example, Maimonedes (1135-1204) posits that animal sacrifice was a primitive form of worship designed for primitive people, and that Jews were ultimately meant to move toward higher forms of worship, such as prayer and, ultimately, completely internal worship of the heart.* Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook (1865-1935) envisioned a restoration of the sacrifical order, but one that would be restricted to vegetarian sacrifices along the lines of the biblical meal offering (mincha**). Unsurprisingly, the Reform and Conservative movements embrace the idea that Jewish worship has "evolved" beyond animal sacrifice.
The traditional musaf prayer (an "additional" prayer for Shabbat and holidays) expresses a desire for the restoration of the sacrifical order. The following paragraph comes from the musaf amidah for Shabbat:
You established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, commanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances with the order of its libations. Those who delight in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai, they [our ancestors] were commanded regarding it, and You, Lord, our God, commanded us to offer the Sabbath additional [musaf] offering in the proper manner. May it be your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, that You bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, so that we may offer the sacrifices required of us there, continual [tamid] offerings in their proper order, and additional offerings in the manner prescribed for them. Then we will prepare and offer the additional offering of this Sabbath day before you with love, according to to Your will, as you wrote for us in your Torah, by the hand of Moses your servant, from Your Glory's mouth. . .
The prayer continues with the text of Numbers 28:9-10, which describes the mussaf offering:
On the Sabbath day, two year-old unblemished lambs, and two tenths of an ephah of fine meal mixed with oil, and its libation. The burnt-offering of the Sabbath, in addition to the continual burnt offering and its libation.
The Conservative Sim Shalom siddur (prayer book) offers several alternative versions of the passage. The least radical casts the offending portions in the past tense:***
You established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, comanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances and the order of its libations. Those who rejoice in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai, they were commanded regarding it, and You, Lord God, commanded them to offer the Sabbath additional offering in the propper manner. May it be Your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, Who returns children to their territory,**** that You bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, where our ancestors offered the offerings required of them, continual offerings in their proper order, and additional offerings in the manner prescribed for them. There we will serve you with love and awe as in ancient times. They prepared and offered the mussaf offering for this Sabbath day before you with love, according to your will, as written in your Torah, by the hand of Moses your servant, from Your Glory's mouth. . .
The quotation from Numbers follows but is designated as optional. After the quote, another line is added:
Compassionate King, accept the prayer of your people Israel with mercy, wherever they dwell.
The Sim Shalom also includes an "alternative" mussaf service, which offers a choice of four substitutes for the above paragraph. The first is based on the traditional version but alters it significantly:
You have established the Sabbath, found favor in its offerings, commanded regarding the interpretation of its ordinances with the order of its libations. Those who rejoice in it will be honored forever, those who savor it merit life, and those who love its teachings have chosen greatness. From Sinai they were commanded regarding it, and you have commanded us to serve you in Jerusalem your city, on your holy Sabbath day, on your holy mountain. May it be Your will, Lord, our God and God of our ancestors, Who returns children to their territory, that you bring us in joy to our land and plant us within our borders, and that violence no longer be heard in our land, or destruction within our borders. There may we serve you in love and awe as in ancient times. Compassionate King, accept the prayer of your people Israel with compassion, wherever they dwell.
The remaining three alternatives were composed in English. They make no mention of past, present, or future worship in Jerusalem, focusing instead on the challanges and rewards of contemporary Sabbath observance.
All this variation within the official liturgy of a single movement attests to the controversiality of eschatology and sacrifice -- two issues to which most "modern" Jews devote very little attention. When we envision a better world, what do we see? A return to a better past? A revival of particular elements of the past, altered to suit contemporary mores? An age of peace between Jews and Muslims (with Jewish control of the Temple Mount, of course)? How do we regard those portions of the Torah that deal with sacrifice? Are they of merely historical interest (not that I have any problem with that)? Are they a forecast of the future? Or is there, perhaps, another option?
* Sorry, no citations this time. You'll just have to take my word for it.
** I am aware of the fact that my transliterations have become less and less consistent over time. You'll have to deal with it.
*** This translation is my own. A less literal translation appears in the siddur itself.
**** A paraphrase of Jeremiah 31:17. The editors of the Sim Shalom never missed an opportunity to sneak in a bit of Zionism.
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Pekudei and "Pious Fraud"
Since the beginning of the new Daf Yomi cycle, there's been some talk among J-bloggers about "getting in on the action." I don't imagine that I could handle Daf Yomi. (DH and I are learning Tractate Berachot together; it's all I can hope that we'll finish by the next seven-year cycle.) There is, however, another Jewish cycle with which I'd like to become more involved: the weekly Torah reading.
I thought of doing this around Simchat Torah, but there's no good reason not to start now. Here is the plan: each week, I'll post a little something related (however loosely) to the Torah portion and/ or Haftarah. These posts may deal with historical-critical, grammatical, or philospohical issues; I expect that they'll be very quirky. Hopefully, they'll be interesting to at least a few people other than me.
Here's one for this week's portion, Pekudei:
Pekudei is one of a series of parshiyot that focus on the Tabernacle, a tent-shrine said to have been transported by the Israelites throughout their wanderings in the wilderness. For years, I've wondered idly about the historicity of the Tabernacle. Critical scholars generally agree that it is quite out of place in the wilderness setting assigned to it by the biblical narrative. All the same, the Bible's description of the Tabernacle is so detailed that I find it difficult to believe that it is no more than a "pious fraud" of a later age, as Graf and Wellhausen suggested. (DH thinks I might change my mind if I read The Silmerillion, but it's not exactly at the top of my reading list.)
More recently, scholars such as Frank Moore Cross, Richard Elliott Friedman, and Menahem Haran have argued that the descriptions of the Tabernacle do, in fact, have some historical basis. Cross argues (quite plausibly, to my mind) that the descriptions come from plans for the tent-shrine erected by David to house the Ark of the Covenant when it was moved to Jerusalem (2 Samuel 6:17). Later, the authors of the Priestly Source (P) incorporated the plans into the narrative of the wilderness wanderings.*
Cross' theory is much more in keeping with my conception of biblical historiography than the Graf-Wellhausen proposal. While I can certainly accept that the biblical authors were often loose with their sources and highly imaginative in their reconstructions of history, I find it difficult to accept that they were responsible for conscious fraudulence, pious or otherwise.
*See Cross, F. M., "The Tabernacle: A Study From an Archaeological and Historical Approach," in Biblical Archaeologist, 10 no 3 S 1947, p 45-68, and
Cross, F. M. "The Priestly Tabernacle in the Light of Recent Research," in Temples and High Places in Biblical Times, Nelson Glueck School of Biblical Archaeology of Hebrew UnionCollege-Jewish Institute of Religion, c1981.
I thought of doing this around Simchat Torah, but there's no good reason not to start now. Here is the plan: each week, I'll post a little something related (however loosely) to the Torah portion and/ or Haftarah. These posts may deal with historical-critical, grammatical, or philospohical issues; I expect that they'll be very quirky. Hopefully, they'll be interesting to at least a few people other than me.
Here's one for this week's portion, Pekudei:
Pekudei is one of a series of parshiyot that focus on the Tabernacle, a tent-shrine said to have been transported by the Israelites throughout their wanderings in the wilderness. For years, I've wondered idly about the historicity of the Tabernacle. Critical scholars generally agree that it is quite out of place in the wilderness setting assigned to it by the biblical narrative. All the same, the Bible's description of the Tabernacle is so detailed that I find it difficult to believe that it is no more than a "pious fraud" of a later age, as Graf and Wellhausen suggested. (DH thinks I might change my mind if I read The Silmerillion, but it's not exactly at the top of my reading list.)
More recently, scholars such as Frank Moore Cross, Richard Elliott Friedman, and Menahem Haran have argued that the descriptions of the Tabernacle do, in fact, have some historical basis. Cross argues (quite plausibly, to my mind) that the descriptions come from plans for the tent-shrine erected by David to house the Ark of the Covenant when it was moved to Jerusalem (2 Samuel 6:17). Later, the authors of the Priestly Source (P) incorporated the plans into the narrative of the wilderness wanderings.*
Cross' theory is much more in keeping with my conception of biblical historiography than the Graf-Wellhausen proposal. While I can certainly accept that the biblical authors were often loose with their sources and highly imaginative in their reconstructions of history, I find it difficult to accept that they were responsible for conscious fraudulence, pious or otherwise.
*See Cross, F. M., "The Tabernacle: A Study From an Archaeological and Historical Approach," in Biblical Archaeologist, 10 no 3 S 1947, p 45-68, and
Cross, F. M. "The Priestly Tabernacle in the Light of Recent Research," in Temples and High Places in Biblical Times, Nelson Glueck School of Biblical Archaeology of Hebrew UnionCollege-Jewish Institute of Religion, c1981.
Wednesday, March 02, 2005
Can We Declare a Holiday?
Check it out:
Cabot Vermont Sharp Cheddar that is certified kosher by Orthodox Union (OU-D) will be available exclusively from this website starting this March. All of the cheeses in our online store (except for Smoky Bacon Cheddar) are already certified kosher by Tablet-K and certified halal by the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA). However, we have received many consumer inquiries about providing OU-certified cheddar, so we are conducting this market test. If successful, we will make this product a permanent addition to our web shopping selection. In the future, we may even explore making it available through your local supermarket. It's coming here in March -- be sure to tell your friends.
Cabot Vermont Sharp Cheddar that is certified kosher by Orthodox Union (OU-D) will be available exclusively from this website starting this March. All of the cheeses in our online store (except for Smoky Bacon Cheddar) are already certified kosher by Tablet-K and certified halal by the Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA). However, we have received many consumer inquiries about providing OU-certified cheddar, so we are conducting this market test. If successful, we will make this product a permanent addition to our web shopping selection. In the future, we may even explore making it available through your local supermarket. It's coming here in March -- be sure to tell your friends.
Tuesday, March 01, 2005
Hopefully the Last Summers Post
Cathy Young finally wrote a column on the Summers affair. As expected, it is the most clear-headed take on the subject that I've read, and I've read quite a bit. If you're not completely sick of the whole business by now, definitely check it out.
By the way, if you'd like to read what Summers actually said, it is available here. The groveling letters are here and here.
By the way, if you'd like to read what Summers actually said, it is available here. The groveling letters are here and here.
Wednesday, February 16, 2005
Monday, February 14, 2005
SBL Resolution Results
The official summary is here. As Ed Cook notes (in somewhat different words), it doesn't account for the fuck-around factor. My opinion on the substance of the poll has not changed.
Tuesday, February 08, 2005
Last Chance to Vote!
The polls are open for the final round of voting at Israellycool. Only one vote each this time, so choose carefully.
(I realize that I've been chronically late with these annoucements. That probably has something to do with not being a candidate.)
(I realize that I've been chronically late with these annoucements. That probably has something to do with not being a candidate.)
Wednesday, February 02, 2005
Sullivan on Summers
What he said.
I particularly like this quote, from Steven Pinker:
Look, the truth cannot be offensive. Perhaps the hypothesis is wrong, but how would we ever find out whether it is wrong if it is 'offensive' even to consider it? People who storm out of a meeting at the mention of a hypothesis, or declare it taboo or offensive without providing arguments or evidence, don't get the concept of a university or free inquiry.
I particularly like this quote, from Steven Pinker:
Look, the truth cannot be offensive. Perhaps the hypothesis is wrong, but how would we ever find out whether it is wrong if it is 'offensive' even to consider it? People who storm out of a meeting at the mention of a hypothesis, or declare it taboo or offensive without providing arguments or evidence, don't get the concept of a university or free inquiry.
Tuesday, February 01, 2005
So, Who Did Write the Bible?
When people ask me about biblical criticism, I often refer them to Who Wrote the Bible,* by Richard Eliott Friedman. The book offers a clear, cogent (albeit sometimes overly simplistic) defense of the Documentary Hypothesis, and it is easy and fun to read. I'm not out to persuade anyone to accept the hypothesis -- you can believe whatever you like -- but I do get irritated when people make smug deprecating comments about that which they do not fully understand. If you're going to criticize the critics, the least you can do is a bit of background reading.
(Disclaimer: If you fear a spiritual crisis, or if your name is Meredith, you are advised to stop reading now.)
Rabbi David Gottlieb of Ohr Someach had the integrity to read Friedman's book, and he posted a fairly detailed response on his website. Unfortunately, the response is filled with misconceptions, both minor and fundamental. I thought it might be worth responding to the response. (All right, someone asked me to.)
Gottlieb writes:
In describing objections to the traditional view that Moses wrote the Five Books, Friedman includes statements “that Moses was not likely to have said,” – e.g. the statement that Moses was the humblest of all men - and the fact that Moses is referred to in the third person. But these objections ignore the real traditional view that the author of the Five Books is G-d. It is not Moses writing his own story, but G-d telling Moses [sic!] story. Thus referring Moses in the third person is fully appropriate, and there is no failure of humility on Moses part in G-d’s writing that he was humble.
I think that Rabbi Gottlieb is missing the point. Friedman is not arguing with those who claim that God is the sole Author of the Bible. There is no way to refute such a claim. An omnipotent God can write a book in several different styles, using the language of different periods, etc. etc. He can also bury dinosaur bones in the earth and alter the half-life of Carbon-14, just to trick us. A distinction must be made between critical analysis and faith. A critical reader, ideally, makes no assumptions, and accepts whatever conclusions are best supported by the evidence. A person of faith, on the other hand, interprets the evidence on the basis of a predetermined conclusion. The person of faith is satisfied with an argument of plausibility, while the critical reader demands a preponderance of evidence. I do not mean to denigrate faith, but it must be accepted for what it is.
Back to Gottlieb:
Friedman ignores – or is unaware of – the fact that it is standard practice in the Bible for the speaker to use the third person when referring to himself. For example, in Exodus 19,11, G-d is speaking to Moses and says, “… for on the third day HASHEM will descend…” In Joshua 1,9, G-d is speaking to Joshua and says, “…for HASHEM your G-d is with you…”
In both of these cases the speaker is God. The principle cannot be so easily extended to Moses.
Other examples are Exodus 24,1 and I Samuel 12,11.
I don't see the relevance of these passages.
Friedman quotes, and approves the objection of Carlstadt that “…the account of Moses’ death is written in the same style as texts that precede it. This makes it difficult to claim that Joshua or anyone else merely added a few lines to an otherwise Mosaic manuscript.” Again, this is irrelevant to the traditional view of divine authorship – who is to say that G-d will not complete His book in the same style, using a different scribe?
Agreed. However, the traditional view of divine authorship is essentially irrelevant to Friedman's argument.
But even if one assumes that the human writer of the end did so on his own, why would he not imitate the style of the whole? Indeed, Friedman himself (P. 84) uses the very same logic to explain similarities in style in the J and E documents.
Arguments from style are inherently weak. However, Gottlieb's own argument is merely one of plausibility. A critical reader assumes multiple authorship only where there is positive evidence in its favor, and such evidence is conspicuously absent from Deut. 34.
Friedman cites the objection that the phrase “until this day” [for events that occurred in the time of Moses – D.G.] implies that the writer lived at a later time. On p. 21 he says the same for “There never arose another prophet in Israel like Moses….” But again, this ignores the traditional view that the author of the text is G-d Who gave it through Moses for all future generations. Thus it is quite acceptable for there to be passages relating to the time of the later reader.
Divine vs. human authorship aside (I'd rather not beat a dead horse), the fallacy of this argument is immediately apparent to anyone who goes to the trouble of reading the relevant verses. I'll take one example of many, Gen. 35:20: "Over her grave Jacob set up a pillar; it is the pillar at Rachel's grave to this day." I've visited the supposed site of Rachel's burial, and I don't recall seeing a pillar. The verse was written for an audience living when the pillar was standing, not for us.
In addition, there is internal evidence for the traditional view. Genesis 22:14 says “Abraham called the name of that site “Hashem Yireh,” as it will be said this day “On the mountain Hashem will be seen.” Now the verb is in the future tense: it will be said.
Biblical Hebrew has no "future tense" per se. The verb yera'eh is in the imperfect, which is often used for future actions, but may also have a more general durative sense, describing past actions that continue into the present, or present actions that continue into the future.
Similarly, Exodus 10:14 says “[the plague of locusts] was very severe – before it there was no [plague of] locusts like it, and after it there will not be such [a plague].”
The imperfect verb in this verse describes a past action continuing into the author's present. A better translation would be, "after it there would not be such [a plague]."
Friedman cites the objection that the phrase “across the Jordan” to identify Moses location presupposes that the writer was inside the land of Israel, since that phrase refers to the east side of the Jordan. However, according to the text, Moses never entered the land of Israel. Therefore, Moses could not have written that phrase. But the phrase "across the Jordan" is in fact used to refer to the east side of the Jordan even when the speaker himself is on the east side. See Numbers 32:32: "We will cross over ... to the land of Canaan, and our possession of our inheritance [of the land] [will be] across the Jordan." The tribes of Gad and Reuven are agreeing to fight to conquer Canaan and then return to the east side to live. And they make this statement while still on the east side. Nevertheless, they call the east side, where they are standing, "across the Jordan". Moses [sic!] statement should be understood in exactly the same way.
This is a false analogy. The two and a half tribes are saying that they will live across the river from their brethren. The reference point is the territory of the other tribes. The author who wrote that Moses was speaking "from across the Jordan" was also assuming a particular reference point, for a reason: that is where he and his readers lived.
Friedman avers that “… there is hardly a biblical scholar in the world actively working on the problem who would claim that the Five Books of Moses were written by Moses – or by any one person.” Strictly speaking, Friedman is right: no one will say that the Five Books were written by one person. In context, Friedman’s statement is designed to show that the only acceptable view is that of multiple human authorship. But this is a straw man: The traditionalist will also agree with Friedman’s statement, since he holds that it was authored by G-d. Of course, Friedman may intend to exclude the traditional view also. But then he is tendentiously defining who is “really” a biblical scholar to exclude those traditionalists who know the text as well anyone else.
The key phrase here is "actively working on the problem," i.e. the problem of authorship. Those who assume that the Torah was written by Moses at God's dictation cannot be included in this category.
Friedman assigns the story of the rape of Dinah is assigned [sic!] to J, including the explanation of the possession of Shechem by conquest. According to Friedman, E contradicts this explanation by saying that the land was purchased. But neither passage has any divine name at all. So the identification of the authors is one the basis of the theory that there are two authors with their different points of view. But then this passage cannot be evidence for the theory, since it must be assumed that the theory is true in order to show that there were two authors.
This is an important point, but it is based on a fundamental misconception. The variation in divine names was the basis for some of the earliest source identifications, but it is not as central to the Documentary Hypothesis as many laypeople assume. If it were, the hypothesis would indeed be very weak. No reasonable person would argue that a single author could not refer to the Deity by multiple names. The strength of the hypothesis lies in the fact that these different names correlate with different styles, different perspectives, and, in the case of the narratives, contradictory storylines. These other criteria make source criticism possible even where God is not mentioned, or where the names He is given are irrelevant (such as after God reveals his name to Moses in Ex. 3). In this particular instance, one suspects the presence of multiple sources because two different accounts are given for the acquisition of Shechem. The next step is to figure out which source is which on the basis of the available criteria (ideology, style, etc.).
I say that this is an important point because source criticism is, in fact, largely circular. A circular argument is not "proof" in the mathematical sense, but that does not mean that it is worthless. As the old adage goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Take a look at Friedman's analysis of the flood narrative in Who Wrote the Bible, pp. 54-59, or in The Bible With Sources Revealed, pp. 42-47. The narrative divides neatly into two strands, each with its own characteristic language and narrative style, and each of which is more coherent than the composite text. An impartial reader will conclude that the most reasonable explanation for the present state of the text is that two versions of the story have been woven together.
Here is Friedman’s account of the sons of Jacob in the sources J and E. “The group of stories that invoke E are the stories of Dan, Naftali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zebulon, Ephraim, Manasseh, Benjamin. In short, the E group includes the names of all the tribes of Israel. The group of stories that invoke the name J are the stories of Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah. The first three of the four names on this list are the names of tribes who lost their territory and merged into other tribes. The only name of a tribe with existing territory in the J narrative is Judah. The J story goes even further to justify the ascendancy of Judah….” But this ignores the many passages in which the children are identified as twelve – Gen. 35: 23ff., 45: 8ff., 49: 1ff.
Nowhere does Friedman state that J only knew of Judah or that E only knew of the northern tribes. The issue is one of emphasis. While E is primarily interested in narrating the history of the northern tribes, J tends to focus on Judah, and depicts Judah as the "honorary firstborn."
And the blessing to Judah in chapter 49 – an essential motivation of the J source, according to Friedman – does not use J at all. Indeed, the whole context has J only once – in the blessing to Dan, who belongs to the story of E according to Friedman.
In fact, Friedman attributes the entire poem to J (see Sources Revealed, pp. 114-116).
Friedman says that J justifies Judah as king by disqualifying his three older brothers – Reuben for having had relations with Jacob’s concubine. But the sentence describing this crime – Gen. 35: 22 – is the last verse in a passage – 35: 9-22 – in which the only name that occurs is E – three times.
Gen. 35:22a is actually something of a non sequitur, and it does not contain any divine names. Vv. 9-21 are irrelevant.
According to Friedman there are two stories of Joseph being saved from the brothers – for E it is Reuben who saves Joseph; for J it is Judah. But the text uses no divine names at all. So Friedman can only distinguish the authors by assuming his theory is true. But then the title of his section – “Evidence from the stories” – is wrong. The story cannot be evidence for the theory since we have to accept the theory in order to interpret the story in accordance with the theory.
Again, the proof is in the eating. See Sources Revealed, pp. 94-95.
According to Friedman E portrays Joshua as Moses’ faithful assistant. In J Joshua plays no role. But Ex. Chapter 32 – the story of the golden calf – starts with E and then switches to J, and the verse mentioning Joshua, which occurs in the J section, has neither name.
After God reveals His name to Moses in Ex. 3, both E and P begin to use the tetragrammaton. For the purpose of source criticism, the names are irrelevant in Ex. 32.
According to Friedman the story of the golden calf is invented by priests living in the northern kingdom who have been rejected as priests by the northern king. The story is an implied critique of both north and south. But then how did it become the accepted orthodoxy? Why did not the northern priests succeed is quashing it? How did it spread to the south? Indeed, how did a brand new invented story by a small, rejected group, with clear, self-serving political motivation, get any attention at all?
These are valid questions, and they cut to the heart of what is, I believe, the central failing of Friedman's books. Political motivations can explain many things, but they cannot explain the preservation of these texts and the sacred status ultimately accorded to them by the Judahite people as a whole. The ancient Israelites were not, apparently, as cynical as R. E. Friedman.
According to Friedman Aaron is not criticized in the story of the golden calf since according to the tradition he was a high priest, and as such “…he cannot be pictured as suffering any hurt from G-d….” I suppose Friedman means this as an observation concerning the general religious mores of the times. But then we read in the recapitulation of the golden calf [Deut. 9: 20] “And G-d was outraged with Aaron to destroy him”.
E's chief consideration here is, according to Friedman, not ideological but historical:
[N]o matter how much antipathy the author may have felt toward Aaron's descendants, that author could not change the entire historical recollection of his people. They had a tradition that Aaron was an ancient high priest. The high priest cannot be pictured as suffering any hurt from God because in such a case he could not have continued to serve as high priest (p. 72).
Back to Gottlieb:
Friedman points out that the story says gods in the plural even though there is only one calf because Yerovom had two calves and the writer quoted his [sic!] in order to discredit his religious practice. But this makes the story itself incoherent. What is the polemical effect of a story that is obviously incoherent to even the casual reader?
The issue is not merely that "Yerovom had two calves," but that the words "Here are your gods, Israel, that brought you up from the land of Egypt" are identical to those used by Jeroboam in 1 Kgs. 12:28. In Friedman's words:
the writer of the golden calf account in Exodus seems to have taken the words that were traditionally ascribed to Jeroboam and placed them in the mouths of the people. This made the connection between his golden calf story and the golden calves of the kingdom of Israel crystal clear to his readers (p. 73).
Back to Gottlieb, again:
According to Friedman there is a difference between J and E concerning idol worship and manufacture. J forbids only molten statues. E prohibits both moten and gold-plated statues. Friedman’s explanation: Yerovom’s calves were molten while Solomon’s cherubs were gold-plated. Thus J condemns only Yerovom’s practice in the north – that fits J as a southern source. E condemns both – that fits E as a northern source criticizing both north and south. But the original cherubim of Moses were in fact solid gold – see Ex. 25:18 and 37:6 – and those passages are J.
The Hebrew term is miqshah, usually translated "beaten work," which may refer to gold leaf. In any case, the verses that Gottlieb cites are P, not J.
Furthermore, the text in I Kings 8:1-4 says explicitly that Solomon put the aron of Hashem – whose cover is the molten cherubim – in his temple.
There is no reference to the material of which the cherubim are made in this passage.
According to Friedman, “E rather attributes much importance to the Tent of Meeting….but it is never mentioned in J.” [Friedman’s italics.] Now there must be some mistake here – there are many passages in which the only name is J in which the Tent of Meeting is mentioned, for example: Ex. 30: 16, 18; 40: 7, 30; and especially 33: 7 where it gets its name!
The mistake is Gottlieb's. These passages are P.
According to Friedman, J is sympathetic to women and E is not. But see Ge. 21:1-13 – the passage begins with J, but it is E who commands Abraham to obey Sarah, and the passage continues with E saving Hagar. And see 31:1-16 – when Jacob’s uncle and cousins turn against him, and G-d commands him to return home, Jacob invites his wives to a private conference in which he describes the facts and the women give their free consent [“All the G-d has told you to do, do!”]. This is exemplary consideration for his wives – and aside from one J at the beginning, the whole passage is E.
Friedman never claims that E is unsympathetic to women. His claim is that J's stories are "much more concerned with women and . . . sensitive to their needs" [italics mine] than E's. That said, I basically agree with Gottlieb. This argument is silly.
One standard problem with all of this is the inconsistencies [sic!] in the character of the imagined editor. He preserved both documents because the people were familiar with them – but he cut and pasted them so that the result was very different from each. He cut and pasted to avoid doubts concerning authenticity, but he left in obvious contradictions and redundancies – precisely the material that leads the “critics” to doubt authenticity.
Interesting, isn't it? The redactor seems to have been more concerned with preserving the sacred texts than with ironing out the contradictions. One might reasonably ask why he would have bothered combining them at all, and indeed, this has been the subject of much historical conjecture. My favorite theory is that Artaxerxes called upon the various peoples of his empire to compile written collections of their local laws (see Ez. 7:23-26). The Judahites, for whatever reason, included their historical texts in this volume.
Another standard problem is to identify the editor. In chapter 13 Friedman votes for Ezra. But this creates an historical problem. In Ezra’s time most Jews were living in Babylon, there was a sizable community in Alexandria, there was the community in the land of Israel, and smaller communities elsewhere. None of these communities is supposed to have the five Books, since that text has not been invented yet. And different groups supported different texts [p. 225]. Now Ezra is creating a major revolution: replacing all the partial texts with a brand new text. There is no discussion of this event anywhere – no record of objections, those who accepted and those who rejected the text, no celebration of the new text, no myth of Ezra’s holiness etc. etc. I suggest that this silence of the historical record is enough by itself to reject Ezra – and anyone else living in a time to which these facts apply.
I suggest that any such objections would have been suppressed.
One final observation: Friedman remarks that in the world that produced the Bible “[p]robably the most important single thing was religion.” Yet the motivations that Friedman assigns to the writers of the various texts are political, economic, and personal. There is no pure religious motivation at all. I think that is very strange. Well, not so strange – I can easily understand why it appeals to Friedman and his colleagues. It casts religion in a thoroughly modern image, their own image. But it is surely very suspect as a reasonable reconstruction of the psychology of 2500 years ago, as Friedman’s own remark above attests.
Again, I agree that Friedman is often too cynical. However, I am skeptical of the notion of "pure religious motivation" in any context, particularly a context in which religion permeates every aspect of life. It can hardly be denied that religious people often conflate their own will with that of the Almighty. I could easily begin a discussion of contemporary politics right now, but this post is long enough as it is.
* The title is misleading. Who Wrote the Torah, or Who Wrote the Pentateuch, would have been more accurate. The former, I suppose, sounded too Jewish, and the latter would have made the average layperson scratch his head, so Friedman ended up with a gross inaccuracy. That's what happens when you write for the masses.
(Disclaimer: If you fear a spiritual crisis, or if your name is Meredith, you are advised to stop reading now.)
Rabbi David Gottlieb of Ohr Someach had the integrity to read Friedman's book, and he posted a fairly detailed response on his website. Unfortunately, the response is filled with misconceptions, both minor and fundamental. I thought it might be worth responding to the response. (All right, someone asked me to.)
Gottlieb writes:
In describing objections to the traditional view that Moses wrote the Five Books, Friedman includes statements “that Moses was not likely to have said,” – e.g. the statement that Moses was the humblest of all men - and the fact that Moses is referred to in the third person. But these objections ignore the real traditional view that the author of the Five Books is G-d. It is not Moses writing his own story, but G-d telling Moses [sic!] story. Thus referring Moses in the third person is fully appropriate, and there is no failure of humility on Moses part in G-d’s writing that he was humble.
I think that Rabbi Gottlieb is missing the point. Friedman is not arguing with those who claim that God is the sole Author of the Bible. There is no way to refute such a claim. An omnipotent God can write a book in several different styles, using the language of different periods, etc. etc. He can also bury dinosaur bones in the earth and alter the half-life of Carbon-14, just to trick us. A distinction must be made between critical analysis and faith. A critical reader, ideally, makes no assumptions, and accepts whatever conclusions are best supported by the evidence. A person of faith, on the other hand, interprets the evidence on the basis of a predetermined conclusion. The person of faith is satisfied with an argument of plausibility, while the critical reader demands a preponderance of evidence. I do not mean to denigrate faith, but it must be accepted for what it is.
Back to Gottlieb:
Friedman ignores – or is unaware of – the fact that it is standard practice in the Bible for the speaker to use the third person when referring to himself. For example, in Exodus 19,11, G-d is speaking to Moses and says, “… for on the third day HASHEM will descend…” In Joshua 1,9, G-d is speaking to Joshua and says, “…for HASHEM your G-d is with you…”
In both of these cases the speaker is God. The principle cannot be so easily extended to Moses.
Other examples are Exodus 24,1 and I Samuel 12,11.
I don't see the relevance of these passages.
Friedman quotes, and approves the objection of Carlstadt that “…the account of Moses’ death is written in the same style as texts that precede it. This makes it difficult to claim that Joshua or anyone else merely added a few lines to an otherwise Mosaic manuscript.” Again, this is irrelevant to the traditional view of divine authorship – who is to say that G-d will not complete His book in the same style, using a different scribe?
Agreed. However, the traditional view of divine authorship is essentially irrelevant to Friedman's argument.
But even if one assumes that the human writer of the end did so on his own, why would he not imitate the style of the whole? Indeed, Friedman himself (P. 84) uses the very same logic to explain similarities in style in the J and E documents.
Arguments from style are inherently weak. However, Gottlieb's own argument is merely one of plausibility. A critical reader assumes multiple authorship only where there is positive evidence in its favor, and such evidence is conspicuously absent from Deut. 34.
Friedman cites the objection that the phrase “until this day” [for events that occurred in the time of Moses – D.G.] implies that the writer lived at a later time. On p. 21 he says the same for “There never arose another prophet in Israel like Moses….” But again, this ignores the traditional view that the author of the text is G-d Who gave it through Moses for all future generations. Thus it is quite acceptable for there to be passages relating to the time of the later reader.
Divine vs. human authorship aside (I'd rather not beat a dead horse), the fallacy of this argument is immediately apparent to anyone who goes to the trouble of reading the relevant verses. I'll take one example of many, Gen. 35:20: "Over her grave Jacob set up a pillar; it is the pillar at Rachel's grave to this day." I've visited the supposed site of Rachel's burial, and I don't recall seeing a pillar. The verse was written for an audience living when the pillar was standing, not for us.
In addition, there is internal evidence for the traditional view. Genesis 22:14 says “Abraham called the name of that site “Hashem Yireh,” as it will be said this day “On the mountain Hashem will be seen.” Now the verb is in the future tense: it will be said.
Biblical Hebrew has no "future tense" per se. The verb yera'eh is in the imperfect, which is often used for future actions, but may also have a more general durative sense, describing past actions that continue into the present, or present actions that continue into the future.
Similarly, Exodus 10:14 says “[the plague of locusts] was very severe – before it there was no [plague of] locusts like it, and after it there will not be such [a plague].”
The imperfect verb in this verse describes a past action continuing into the author's present. A better translation would be, "after it there would not be such [a plague]."
Friedman cites the objection that the phrase “across the Jordan” to identify Moses location presupposes that the writer was inside the land of Israel, since that phrase refers to the east side of the Jordan. However, according to the text, Moses never entered the land of Israel. Therefore, Moses could not have written that phrase. But the phrase "across the Jordan" is in fact used to refer to the east side of the Jordan even when the speaker himself is on the east side. See Numbers 32:32: "We will cross over ... to the land of Canaan, and our possession of our inheritance [of the land] [will be] across the Jordan." The tribes of Gad and Reuven are agreeing to fight to conquer Canaan and then return to the east side to live. And they make this statement while still on the east side. Nevertheless, they call the east side, where they are standing, "across the Jordan". Moses [sic!] statement should be understood in exactly the same way.
This is a false analogy. The two and a half tribes are saying that they will live across the river from their brethren. The reference point is the territory of the other tribes. The author who wrote that Moses was speaking "from across the Jordan" was also assuming a particular reference point, for a reason: that is where he and his readers lived.
Friedman avers that “… there is hardly a biblical scholar in the world actively working on the problem who would claim that the Five Books of Moses were written by Moses – or by any one person.” Strictly speaking, Friedman is right: no one will say that the Five Books were written by one person. In context, Friedman’s statement is designed to show that the only acceptable view is that of multiple human authorship. But this is a straw man: The traditionalist will also agree with Friedman’s statement, since he holds that it was authored by G-d. Of course, Friedman may intend to exclude the traditional view also. But then he is tendentiously defining who is “really” a biblical scholar to exclude those traditionalists who know the text as well anyone else.
The key phrase here is "actively working on the problem," i.e. the problem of authorship. Those who assume that the Torah was written by Moses at God's dictation cannot be included in this category.
Friedman assigns the story of the rape of Dinah is assigned [sic!] to J, including the explanation of the possession of Shechem by conquest. According to Friedman, E contradicts this explanation by saying that the land was purchased. But neither passage has any divine name at all. So the identification of the authors is one the basis of the theory that there are two authors with their different points of view. But then this passage cannot be evidence for the theory, since it must be assumed that the theory is true in order to show that there were two authors.
This is an important point, but it is based on a fundamental misconception. The variation in divine names was the basis for some of the earliest source identifications, but it is not as central to the Documentary Hypothesis as many laypeople assume. If it were, the hypothesis would indeed be very weak. No reasonable person would argue that a single author could not refer to the Deity by multiple names. The strength of the hypothesis lies in the fact that these different names correlate with different styles, different perspectives, and, in the case of the narratives, contradictory storylines. These other criteria make source criticism possible even where God is not mentioned, or where the names He is given are irrelevant (such as after God reveals his name to Moses in Ex. 3). In this particular instance, one suspects the presence of multiple sources because two different accounts are given for the acquisition of Shechem. The next step is to figure out which source is which on the basis of the available criteria (ideology, style, etc.).
I say that this is an important point because source criticism is, in fact, largely circular. A circular argument is not "proof" in the mathematical sense, but that does not mean that it is worthless. As the old adage goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Take a look at Friedman's analysis of the flood narrative in Who Wrote the Bible, pp. 54-59, or in The Bible With Sources Revealed, pp. 42-47. The narrative divides neatly into two strands, each with its own characteristic language and narrative style, and each of which is more coherent than the composite text. An impartial reader will conclude that the most reasonable explanation for the present state of the text is that two versions of the story have been woven together.
Here is Friedman’s account of the sons of Jacob in the sources J and E. “The group of stories that invoke E are the stories of Dan, Naftali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zebulon, Ephraim, Manasseh, Benjamin. In short, the E group includes the names of all the tribes of Israel. The group of stories that invoke the name J are the stories of Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah. The first three of the four names on this list are the names of tribes who lost their territory and merged into other tribes. The only name of a tribe with existing territory in the J narrative is Judah. The J story goes even further to justify the ascendancy of Judah….” But this ignores the many passages in which the children are identified as twelve – Gen. 35: 23ff., 45: 8ff., 49: 1ff.
Nowhere does Friedman state that J only knew of Judah or that E only knew of the northern tribes. The issue is one of emphasis. While E is primarily interested in narrating the history of the northern tribes, J tends to focus on Judah, and depicts Judah as the "honorary firstborn."
And the blessing to Judah in chapter 49 – an essential motivation of the J source, according to Friedman – does not use J at all. Indeed, the whole context has J only once – in the blessing to Dan, who belongs to the story of E according to Friedman.
In fact, Friedman attributes the entire poem to J (see Sources Revealed, pp. 114-116).
Friedman says that J justifies Judah as king by disqualifying his three older brothers – Reuben for having had relations with Jacob’s concubine. But the sentence describing this crime – Gen. 35: 22 – is the last verse in a passage – 35: 9-22 – in which the only name that occurs is E – three times.
Gen. 35:22a is actually something of a non sequitur, and it does not contain any divine names. Vv. 9-21 are irrelevant.
According to Friedman there are two stories of Joseph being saved from the brothers – for E it is Reuben who saves Joseph; for J it is Judah. But the text uses no divine names at all. So Friedman can only distinguish the authors by assuming his theory is true. But then the title of his section – “Evidence from the stories” – is wrong. The story cannot be evidence for the theory since we have to accept the theory in order to interpret the story in accordance with the theory.
Again, the proof is in the eating. See Sources Revealed, pp. 94-95.
According to Friedman E portrays Joshua as Moses’ faithful assistant. In J Joshua plays no role. But Ex. Chapter 32 – the story of the golden calf – starts with E and then switches to J, and the verse mentioning Joshua, which occurs in the J section, has neither name.
After God reveals His name to Moses in Ex. 3, both E and P begin to use the tetragrammaton. For the purpose of source criticism, the names are irrelevant in Ex. 32.
According to Friedman the story of the golden calf is invented by priests living in the northern kingdom who have been rejected as priests by the northern king. The story is an implied critique of both north and south. But then how did it become the accepted orthodoxy? Why did not the northern priests succeed is quashing it? How did it spread to the south? Indeed, how did a brand new invented story by a small, rejected group, with clear, self-serving political motivation, get any attention at all?
These are valid questions, and they cut to the heart of what is, I believe, the central failing of Friedman's books. Political motivations can explain many things, but they cannot explain the preservation of these texts and the sacred status ultimately accorded to them by the Judahite people as a whole. The ancient Israelites were not, apparently, as cynical as R. E. Friedman.
According to Friedman Aaron is not criticized in the story of the golden calf since according to the tradition he was a high priest, and as such “…he cannot be pictured as suffering any hurt from G-d….” I suppose Friedman means this as an observation concerning the general religious mores of the times. But then we read in the recapitulation of the golden calf [Deut. 9: 20] “And G-d was outraged with Aaron to destroy him”.
E's chief consideration here is, according to Friedman, not ideological but historical:
[N]o matter how much antipathy the author may have felt toward Aaron's descendants, that author could not change the entire historical recollection of his people. They had a tradition that Aaron was an ancient high priest. The high priest cannot be pictured as suffering any hurt from God because in such a case he could not have continued to serve as high priest (p. 72).
Back to Gottlieb:
Friedman points out that the story says gods in the plural even though there is only one calf because Yerovom had two calves and the writer quoted his [sic!] in order to discredit his religious practice. But this makes the story itself incoherent. What is the polemical effect of a story that is obviously incoherent to even the casual reader?
The issue is not merely that "Yerovom had two calves," but that the words "Here are your gods, Israel, that brought you up from the land of Egypt" are identical to those used by Jeroboam in 1 Kgs. 12:28. In Friedman's words:
the writer of the golden calf account in Exodus seems to have taken the words that were traditionally ascribed to Jeroboam and placed them in the mouths of the people. This made the connection between his golden calf story and the golden calves of the kingdom of Israel crystal clear to his readers (p. 73).
Back to Gottlieb, again:
According to Friedman there is a difference between J and E concerning idol worship and manufacture. J forbids only molten statues. E prohibits both moten and gold-plated statues. Friedman’s explanation: Yerovom’s calves were molten while Solomon’s cherubs were gold-plated. Thus J condemns only Yerovom’s practice in the north – that fits J as a southern source. E condemns both – that fits E as a northern source criticizing both north and south. But the original cherubim of Moses were in fact solid gold – see Ex. 25:18 and 37:6 – and those passages are J.
The Hebrew term is miqshah, usually translated "beaten work," which may refer to gold leaf. In any case, the verses that Gottlieb cites are P, not J.
Furthermore, the text in I Kings 8:1-4 says explicitly that Solomon put the aron of Hashem – whose cover is the molten cherubim – in his temple.
There is no reference to the material of which the cherubim are made in this passage.
According to Friedman, “E rather attributes much importance to the Tent of Meeting….but it is never mentioned in J.” [Friedman’s italics.] Now there must be some mistake here – there are many passages in which the only name is J in which the Tent of Meeting is mentioned, for example: Ex. 30: 16, 18; 40: 7, 30; and especially 33: 7 where it gets its name!
The mistake is Gottlieb's. These passages are P.
According to Friedman, J is sympathetic to women and E is not. But see Ge. 21:1-13 – the passage begins with J, but it is E who commands Abraham to obey Sarah, and the passage continues with E saving Hagar. And see 31:1-16 – when Jacob’s uncle and cousins turn against him, and G-d commands him to return home, Jacob invites his wives to a private conference in which he describes the facts and the women give their free consent [“All the G-d has told you to do, do!”]. This is exemplary consideration for his wives – and aside from one J at the beginning, the whole passage is E.
Friedman never claims that E is unsympathetic to women. His claim is that J's stories are "much more concerned with women and . . . sensitive to their needs" [italics mine] than E's. That said, I basically agree with Gottlieb. This argument is silly.
One standard problem with all of this is the inconsistencies [sic!] in the character of the imagined editor. He preserved both documents because the people were familiar with them – but he cut and pasted them so that the result was very different from each. He cut and pasted to avoid doubts concerning authenticity, but he left in obvious contradictions and redundancies – precisely the material that leads the “critics” to doubt authenticity.
Interesting, isn't it? The redactor seems to have been more concerned with preserving the sacred texts than with ironing out the contradictions. One might reasonably ask why he would have bothered combining them at all, and indeed, this has been the subject of much historical conjecture. My favorite theory is that Artaxerxes called upon the various peoples of his empire to compile written collections of their local laws (see Ez. 7:23-26). The Judahites, for whatever reason, included their historical texts in this volume.
Another standard problem is to identify the editor. In chapter 13 Friedman votes for Ezra. But this creates an historical problem. In Ezra’s time most Jews were living in Babylon, there was a sizable community in Alexandria, there was the community in the land of Israel, and smaller communities elsewhere. None of these communities is supposed to have the five Books, since that text has not been invented yet. And different groups supported different texts [p. 225]. Now Ezra is creating a major revolution: replacing all the partial texts with a brand new text. There is no discussion of this event anywhere – no record of objections, those who accepted and those who rejected the text, no celebration of the new text, no myth of Ezra’s holiness etc. etc. I suggest that this silence of the historical record is enough by itself to reject Ezra – and anyone else living in a time to which these facts apply.
I suggest that any such objections would have been suppressed.
One final observation: Friedman remarks that in the world that produced the Bible “[p]robably the most important single thing was religion.” Yet the motivations that Friedman assigns to the writers of the various texts are political, economic, and personal. There is no pure religious motivation at all. I think that is very strange. Well, not so strange – I can easily understand why it appeals to Friedman and his colleagues. It casts religion in a thoroughly modern image, their own image. But it is surely very suspect as a reasonable reconstruction of the psychology of 2500 years ago, as Friedman’s own remark above attests.
Again, I agree that Friedman is often too cynical. However, I am skeptical of the notion of "pure religious motivation" in any context, particularly a context in which religion permeates every aspect of life. It can hardly be denied that religious people often conflate their own will with that of the Almighty. I could easily begin a discussion of contemporary politics right now, but this post is long enough as it is.
* The title is misleading. Who Wrote the Torah, or Who Wrote the Pentateuch, would have been more accurate. The former, I suppose, sounded too Jewish, and the latter would have made the average layperson scratch his head, so Friedman ended up with a gross inaccuracy. That's what happens when you write for the masses.
Thursday, January 27, 2005
Prohibition?
After an embarrassing incident involving underage drinking, the OU has issued a ban on kiddush clubs. Some people are happy about this, mainly, it seems, because they dislike the kiddush clubs at their local shuls. This is not entirely logical. You may have had a bad experience at summer camp, but that doesn't necessarily mean that camp is an evil institution and ought to be banned. I've visited the kiddush club at my parents' shul a number of times. It is not at all exclusive (heck, they let me in), and I have never seen anyone, let alone a child or teenager, get seriously drunk.
In any case, the incident that supposedly provoked the ban did not occur at a kiddush club. It occurred at an apparently unsupervised party hosted by an 18 year old. If those kids had been drinking single-malt scotch with adults in their community rather than cheap beer with their buddies from school, I doubt that anyone would have had to call the police.
American history has taught us that banning alcohol consumption does not prevent alcoholism. What it does prevent is responsible drinking. People are not normally inclined to behave responsibly when what they are doing is considered illicit either way. I don't know whether people are actually making kiddush in cloak rooms, but if they are, there is something very wrong with the atmosphere in our shuls, and it isn't the fault of those buying the liquor.
I think it's telling that this ban has been issued by an organization that responded to a sex abuse scandal by cracking down on mingling between boys and girls at youth group events. Do they really think that by turning any contact with the opposite sex into a crime, they are going to prevent sexual harassment? Or was sexual harassment not really the issue? Along the same lines, one can't help but wonder whether the "crackdown" on kiddush clubs is really a response to underage drinking. Especially when a rabbi argues that the problem begins "once people start bringing in cholent."
In any case, the incident that supposedly provoked the ban did not occur at a kiddush club. It occurred at an apparently unsupervised party hosted by an 18 year old. If those kids had been drinking single-malt scotch with adults in their community rather than cheap beer with their buddies from school, I doubt that anyone would have had to call the police.
American history has taught us that banning alcohol consumption does not prevent alcoholism. What it does prevent is responsible drinking. People are not normally inclined to behave responsibly when what they are doing is considered illicit either way. I don't know whether people are actually making kiddush in cloak rooms, but if they are, there is something very wrong with the atmosphere in our shuls, and it isn't the fault of those buying the liquor.
I think it's telling that this ban has been issued by an organization that responded to a sex abuse scandal by cracking down on mingling between boys and girls at youth group events. Do they really think that by turning any contact with the opposite sex into a crime, they are going to prevent sexual harassment? Or was sexual harassment not really the issue? Along the same lines, one can't help but wonder whether the "crackdown" on kiddush clubs is really a response to underage drinking. Especially when a rabbi argues that the problem begins "once people start bringing in cholent."
Election Day . . .Er, Week
The following is a non-partisan public service announcement.
For those who haven't heard, the polls are open at Israellycool. Take note: "You can vote only once in 24 hours." (Translation: You can vote every 24 hours.) Go support your favorite Jewish and Israeli blogs.
For those who haven't heard, the polls are open at Israellycool. Take note: "You can vote only once in 24 hours." (Translation: You can vote every 24 hours.) Go support your favorite Jewish and Israeli blogs.
Sunday, January 23, 2005
Recipes
I made these cookies in honor of Tu Bishvat. They are high in fiber and low in sugar and fat. The texture is somewhat unusual, but I enjoyed them very much.
Four-Fruit Trolls
(adapted from The All-American Cookie Book, by Nancy Baggett)
Yield: 35 cookies
2/3 cup golden raisins
2/3 cup dried sweetened cranberries
1 cup finely diced unpeeled Golden Delicious apple (about 1 medium)
2/3 cup chopped pitted dates
1 cup all-purpose white flour
1 cup whole wheat flour
1 1/4 tsp ground cinnamon
1/2 tsp ground nutmeg
1/2 tsp cloves
1 tsp baking soda
1/4 tsp salt
1 1/3 cups packed brown sugar (the cookbook says light, I used dark)
1/4 cup corn oil or canola oil
3 tbs unsalted butter or stick margarine, slightly softened
2 large eggs
1/4 cup unsweetened apple butter, thinned with 1 tbs water
Preheat the oven to 350 degrees F. Grease several baking sheets or coat with nonstick spray.
In a medium bowl, cover the raisins and cranberries with hot water. Let soak for about 10 mins; drain well. Stir in the apple and the dates; set aside.
In a medium bowl, thoroughly stir together the white and whole wheat flours, cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves, baking soda, and salt; set aside. In a large bowl, with an electric mixer on medium speed, beat together the brown sugar, oil, and butter or margarine until very well blended. Add the eggs and apple butter and beat until fluffy and evenly incorporated. Reduce the speed to low, add one-third of the flour mixture, and beat until the dough stiffens. Stir in the remaining flour mixture until evenly incorporated.
Drop the dough onto the baking sheets in generous golf-ball sized mounds, spacing about 2 1/2 inches apart.
Bake the cookies, one sheet at a time, in the middle of the oven for 9-12 mins, or until browned and barely firm when touched in the centers. Reverse the sheet from front to back halfway through baking to ensure even browning. Transfer the sheet to a wire rack and let stand until the cookies firm up, 1-2 mins. Using a spatula, transfer the cookies to wire racks. Let stand until completely cooled.
Store in an airtight container for up to 1 week or freeze for up to 1 month.
Four-Fruit Trolls
(adapted from The All-American Cookie Book, by Nancy Baggett)
Yield: 35 cookies
2/3 cup golden raisins
2/3 cup dried sweetened cranberries
1 cup finely diced unpeeled Golden Delicious apple (about 1 medium)
2/3 cup chopped pitted dates
1 cup all-purpose white flour
1 cup whole wheat flour
1 1/4 tsp ground cinnamon
1/2 tsp ground nutmeg
1/2 tsp cloves
1 tsp baking soda
1/4 tsp salt
1 1/3 cups packed brown sugar (the cookbook says light, I used dark)
1/4 cup corn oil or canola oil
3 tbs unsalted butter or stick margarine, slightly softened
2 large eggs
1/4 cup unsweetened apple butter, thinned with 1 tbs water
Preheat the oven to 350 degrees F. Grease several baking sheets or coat with nonstick spray.
In a medium bowl, cover the raisins and cranberries with hot water. Let soak for about 10 mins; drain well. Stir in the apple and the dates; set aside.
In a medium bowl, thoroughly stir together the white and whole wheat flours, cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves, baking soda, and salt; set aside. In a large bowl, with an electric mixer on medium speed, beat together the brown sugar, oil, and butter or margarine until very well blended. Add the eggs and apple butter and beat until fluffy and evenly incorporated. Reduce the speed to low, add one-third of the flour mixture, and beat until the dough stiffens. Stir in the remaining flour mixture until evenly incorporated.
Drop the dough onto the baking sheets in generous golf-ball sized mounds, spacing about 2 1/2 inches apart.
Bake the cookies, one sheet at a time, in the middle of the oven for 9-12 mins, or until browned and barely firm when touched in the centers. Reverse the sheet from front to back halfway through baking to ensure even browning. Transfer the sheet to a wire rack and let stand until the cookies firm up, 1-2 mins. Using a spatula, transfer the cookies to wire racks. Let stand until completely cooled.
Store in an airtight container for up to 1 week or freeze for up to 1 month.
* * *
I haven't yet tried the following recipe, but my mom thought it was good enough to send to all three of her daughters, so it must be pretty wonderful.
Lemon – Basil Chicken
3-pound broiler-fryer chicken
1 lemon
1 clove garlic thinly sliced
1/2 cup snipped fresh or 1 tablespoon dried basil leaves
1/2 teaspoon garlic powder
(soy sauce)
Heat oven to 375°. Remove excess fat from chicken; fasten neck skin of chicken to back with tooth pick. Fold wings across back with tips touching. Grate 2 teaspoons lemon peel; reserve. Cut lemon into halves; rub chicken with juice from 1 lemon half. Place garlic, 1 tablespoon of the fresh basil (1 teaspoon dried basil leaves) and both lemon halves in cavity. Rub chicken with reserved lemon peel; sprinkle garlic powder, remaining basil and soy sauce over chicken.
Place chicken, breast side up, on rack in shallow rectangular roasting pan. Cover and bake 1 hour. Uncover and bake until drumstick meat feels very soft when pressed between fingers, about 30 minutes.
4 servings
Lemon – Basil Chicken
3-pound broiler-fryer chicken
1 lemon
1 clove garlic thinly sliced
1/2 cup snipped fresh or 1 tablespoon dried basil leaves
1/2 teaspoon garlic powder
(soy sauce)
Heat oven to 375°. Remove excess fat from chicken; fasten neck skin of chicken to back with tooth pick. Fold wings across back with tips touching. Grate 2 teaspoons lemon peel; reserve. Cut lemon into halves; rub chicken with juice from 1 lemon half. Place garlic, 1 tablespoon of the fresh basil (1 teaspoon dried basil leaves) and both lemon halves in cavity. Rub chicken with reserved lemon peel; sprinkle garlic powder, remaining basil and soy sauce over chicken.
Place chicken, breast side up, on rack in shallow rectangular roasting pan. Cover and bake 1 hour. Uncover and bake until drumstick meat feels very soft when pressed between fingers, about 30 minutes.
4 servings
Thursday, January 20, 2005
The Summers Controversy
As a friend pointed out this morning, it's all hearsay. There were no reporters at the conferences, and no tapes or transcripts of the speech have been made available to the public. I am trying not to jump to conclusions, but I must admit, I am very angry -- and not at Summers.
It is the height of hypocrisy when the very people who (justifiably) accused Bush of manipulating science for political purposes suggest that the relationship between biology and academic interests is not a legitimate subject for inquiry. It is a closed-minded, knee-jerk reaction to walk out of the room when you hear an economic theory that offends your sensibilities. And, in the end, the theory ought not be so offensive.
No one in academia would deny that women can be brilliant mathematicians, scientists, and engineers. It is patently obvious. The issue here is the proportion of women to men in the technical fields. Should Harvard do everything it can to ensure a one-to-one ratio of female to male scientists, even if the pool of talented female scientists is significantly smaller? Would that really be "equal opportunity employment"?
Call me a closet misogynist, but I think that men and women alike should be treated as individuals, not statistics. The notion that academic departments (the sciences, no less!) "need" more female professors is no more reasonable than the notion that every child "needs" a mother and a father. A mature individual can examine the broader picture without drawing conclusions about herself and her colleagues. It was reasonable for Summers to expect that level of maturity at an invitation-only conference at Harvard.
There is a vast middle ground between biological determinism and the idea that sex is a social construct. The more that we understand about the human mind and the human body, the more complex the nature/nurture problem seems to become. This subject should be studied honestly and openly, not in the service of some extremists' conception of gender. And those who discuss it honestly and openly should not have to apologize, especially at a so-called institution of higher learning.
UPDATE: Here is an interesting look at the "mommy factor," which Summers also mentioned.
It is the height of hypocrisy when the very people who (justifiably) accused Bush of manipulating science for political purposes suggest that the relationship between biology and academic interests is not a legitimate subject for inquiry. It is a closed-minded, knee-jerk reaction to walk out of the room when you hear an economic theory that offends your sensibilities. And, in the end, the theory ought not be so offensive.
No one in academia would deny that women can be brilliant mathematicians, scientists, and engineers. It is patently obvious. The issue here is the proportion of women to men in the technical fields. Should Harvard do everything it can to ensure a one-to-one ratio of female to male scientists, even if the pool of talented female scientists is significantly smaller? Would that really be "equal opportunity employment"?
Call me a closet misogynist, but I think that men and women alike should be treated as individuals, not statistics. The notion that academic departments (the sciences, no less!) "need" more female professors is no more reasonable than the notion that every child "needs" a mother and a father. A mature individual can examine the broader picture without drawing conclusions about herself and her colleagues. It was reasonable for Summers to expect that level of maturity at an invitation-only conference at Harvard.
There is a vast middle ground between biological determinism and the idea that sex is a social construct. The more that we understand about the human mind and the human body, the more complex the nature/nurture problem seems to become. This subject should be studied honestly and openly, not in the service of some extremists' conception of gender. And those who discuss it honestly and openly should not have to apologize, especially at a so-called institution of higher learning.
UPDATE: Here is an interesting look at the "mommy factor," which Summers also mentioned.
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